Abstract: Transmodern ethics establishes moral norms on liberal, pluralist and pragmatic principles. We see a comeback of the negation morals, however not of ontology-anchored morals, as is the case of the God who picks favourites or of the jealous God paradigm, and not even of morals anchored in a contractualist perspective, as is the case in the modern period. The preferred focus is on the value of positivism, of cooperation as a source of efficiency, of personal enrichment, be it cultural, spiritual, or moral, derived from the access to alterity. Tolerance as an ethical value is legitimised by a new, utilitarian humanism. The ethical construction of identity revolves around the value of loyalty to a tradition, a dogma, a mentality, and by extension to any coherent system liable to generate a sense of belonging. Postindustrial ethics uses for instance the value of loyalty as a strategy in marketing, organisational development, political propaganda etc. The policies used in order to increase the loyalty of a shop's customers, the employee's loyalty for the company she works for, the supporter's loyalty to his team, are the translation in layman terms of the loyalty ethics that in spiritual terms was one of the foundations of orthodoxy as loyalty to the tradition of the holy fathers. The values of equality, liberty and fraternity have been more than that, as they have laid the foundations of the modern society.

Key Words: ethical reconstruction; affirmative ethics; retributive ethics; ethical dilemmas; constructionism
Introduction

Postmodernity features the ascension of environmental, feminist, ethnic movements, that debate the fundamental issues of 20th century man and society, a century that could rightly be called a century of extremes. Gilles Lipovetsky considers that postmodern society is a post-moralist one, at the twilight of duty, a more appropriate name for it being “age of minimalism” rather than “the society of generalised permissiveness”. Transmodernism is structurally opposed to postmodernism, accusing the latter of inconsistency in its radical deconstructivism effort. However, the sphere of transmodern ethics still has vast areas of juxtaposition with the postmodern ethics, being separated from it by the introduction of the idea of responsibility.

Transmodernity is a future-oriented ethical project that aims for the moral liberation of the entire humanity, in which both modernity and its negated alterity “both modernity and its negated alterity [...] co-realize themselves in a process of mutual fertilization”.

Transmodern ethics establishes moral norms on liberal, pluralist and pragmatic principles. We see a comeback of the negation morals, however not of ontology-anchored morals, and a preference for a focus on the positive placement of cooperation as a source of efficiency, of personal enrichment, be it cultural, spiritual, or moral. Tolerance as an ethical value and communication with the Other are legitimised by a new, utilitarian humanism. We are also witnessing a sectorialisation of ethics and its migration towards its deontological dimension.

The Christian Roots and Dimension of Transmodern Ethics

Dabrock identifies a moral consanguinity between Christianity and contemporary social democratic commitments to human rights and human dignity. From the perspective of virtue ethics, Gianni Vattimo points out the Protestant-Christian roots of individualist ethics specific to Western culture and to the preservation of the values of Christian ethics, despite the rejection of the Christian ontological foundation: “the lay space of modern liberalism is far more religious than liberalism and Christian thought are willing to recognize ... Christianity’s vocation consists in deepening its own physiognomy as source and condition for the possibility of secularity”.

In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism Max Weber analysis the types of society generated by the specificity of the religious ethical vision. A vision in which salvation is the privilege of the chosen, and the sign of being chosen is personal success, generates in Max Weber’s opinion an individualist society, the roots of nowadays’ pragmatic capitalism. “Labour and individual success are forms of brotherly love, as by fulfilling
one’s own mission one helps fulfil God’s will”11. Salvation is viewed by Protestants as divine grace at work. The signs of divine grace at work are individual successes, as well as the individual’s labour. Work in itself is a form of asceticism, made possible by the manifestation of grace. Originality and authenticity are the triumph of the individual, essence and warranty of personal success. Thus, success is an axiological value that generates ethical systems12. It is not by accident that contemporary psychology stresses personal development techniques and the focus on success. In American neo-Protestantism, the Christic phrase “Love thy neighbour as thyself” generates an ethical vision that asserts the valorisation of the individual. The individualist paradigm, Weber believes13, has its roots in the religious feeling of the presence of Grace. Grace and the gift of God, acting entirely freely, irrespective of human actions, places the chosen ones in a special state of ontological aristocracy, of individuals chosen by God, privileged by His will. Personal spiritual success as a special ontological status, the status of chosen, becomes personal success as a favourite of fate, the ontological condition turning into personal success.

Ethical Reconstructions in Transmodernity

The transfer of the ethical discourse into a predominantly deontological one is an adaptation of the universe of postmoralist ethics to the needs of social pragmatics. Transmodern affirmative ethics14 makes possible an opening towards pragmatics centred on the inherent value of the human individual. For Lipovetsky15 postmodern neo-individualism is at the same time hedonistic and orderly, yearning for autonomy and yet not too inclined towards excess: this is an organisae disorder. In this space, moral criticism is diluted and is subject to different appreciations, but it is no longer founded on an ultimate duty, but instead on microexclusions16. Zygmunt Bauman17 also underlines the existence of unanticipated consequences of human actions in times of mortal uncertainty: obeying certain moral rules is not a guarantee against disastrous consequences. The 20th century has been the century of laboratories and expertise. The number of individuals involved is so high that nobody can be held responsible for the final result, and this floating responsibility gives rise to paradoxes: guilt without guilty parties, crime without criminals, sin without sinners.

Whereas postmodern Humanism is rooted in differentiation and postmodernity is “a civilisation of minorities based on the model of sexual minorities”18, transmodernism, on the contrary, calls for an exit from post-history through a synthesis of the complete man, open to alterity19. The theorists of Western transmodernism –Ray Paul20 notes – believe that it is necessary to go beyond any logic, because any logic is monological, whereas the transmodern being is dialogical21. The transmodern ethos is
one of unity in diversity, or of sensing the universal through the fine fabric of the particular.

Which is, in these circumstances, the most appropriate ethics for a polycentric and networked world such as the transmodern one? Kenneth Gergen considers that ethical projects are drastically limited by the constructionist understanding of the world. The world is a construct of consciousness, and values are awarded through negotiation, and therefore the ethical values themselves are subject to a restructuring process of reinterpretation. It is thus difficult to identify a single direction in ethical construction that would be appropriate for today’s society, starting either from individualism – specific to postmodernism – or from communitarians, specific to transmodernism. Both directions are eligible for the construction of an ethical model for the 21st century. The globalisation of ideologies and the construction of a global culture may be, in the author’s opinion, potential directions for the future.

The changes in the concept of social reality and especially the virtualisation of space shift the ethical accent from morals towards discursive pragmatics, and thus towards the deontics of social construction. The win-win model proposes an ethics of cooperative, multi-polar success. Opposing the ontology of the specific difference, specific to postmodernism, the theorists of transmodernism propose the restoration of the ontological model, with a focus on the systemic and synergetic unity of the Being.

Live and (Artificial) Immortality

The philosophical vision of transmodernity is one of absolute freedom to modify the human body using any technology available in order to improve it, in the hope of attaining immortality. Some of the most significant projects in this direction are the human genome sequencing project, followed by the creation by Craig Venter of the first cell containing synthetic genes. Craig Venter’s team developed the first bacterial cell controlled by synthetic genes, adding to its DNA fragments that distinguish it from a natural cell. Thus, the macromolecules specific to the bacterial chromosome were created through the artificial synthesis of nucleotides, being then transferred into a bacterium from a different species, causing the latter to function and reproduce according to the synthetic genetic code. It took two decades to sequence the first genomes, to identify the genes that were mandatory for life to function, to synthesise them artificially and transplant them into a living cell that would then operate based on the new genetic code, capable of multiplying and of operating autonomously. The implications foreseen by Venter in a 2010 interview were the development of new gene therapies, of beings adapted to living in hostile environments, as well
as other uses in the energy industry, reducing pollution, in biological weapons and military technologies.

The bioethical implications of synthetic biology have resulted in a decision by President Obama to request in the U.S. Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethics Issues the debate of the potential consequences of this discovery. Mathews and Pena\textsuperscript{31} point out the profound ethical implications of creating artificial life, especially with regard to the relationship between man and nature, as well as the insufficient debate on these new relations between man and nature. From a constructivist perspective, it is difficult to conceive such a change in the relationship between man and nature, precisely because man turns nature into culture by lending it meaning. Thus, the creation of artificial life may be assimilated to such a meaning-creation process. It is the responsibility of those who create thusly the meaning of the products of synthetic biology to orient them towards applications that would serve to protect man and nature, instead of opposite purposes. In this debate, an important role must be played by the representatives of all religious confessions, as they can polarise the believers’ opinions and can enrich this construction of knowledge by adding to it the religious dimension of the relationship between God, man and nature.

The concept of \textit{value of life} is the basis both for religious thinking and for the ethics of contemporary biosciences. The differences and the divergence elements that set apart religions, cultures and the individual’s historical experiences are one of the great challenges of transmodern ethics: the differences concerning the concept of \textit{value of life} between the various religious cultures may generate different ethical responses to the challenges of modern biosciences\textsuperscript{32}.

\textbf{The Autonomy of the Individual - The Transmodern Social Facet of Freedom}

The concept of autonomy and its connotations of self-determination and respect for the person play a central role in the theoretical constructions of bioethics. The issue of autonomy arises in domain such as medically-assisted reproduction, genetic counselling, the decision to apply life-support treatments etc.\textsuperscript{33} Bruce Jennings\textsuperscript{34} finds the concept of autonomy is relevant from three perspectives: that of ethics theory that of concept in applied ethics and that of ideology. The author starts from the significant differences between the concept of autonomy in the moral and in the political philosophy and its meanings in bioethics. The bioethical meanings of the term \textit{autonomy}\textsuperscript{35} seem to stem from John Stuart Mill’s idea of \textit{freedom}, rather than from the reason-based autonomy proposed by Kant.

Nowadays the question is how real freedom really is, and how possible is a free and informed decision in these circumstances of
information pressure and of a communicational manipulation which is specific and acknowledged by the postmodern society. We are dealing here with concrete situations such as abortion, which entails an ethical choice between the right to life of the unborn child and the mother’s right to self-determination in respect to her own body. Another example of ethical dilemma generated by the choice between the right to life and the right to a conscience invoked in the case of a religious community that refuses medical treatment.

Sartre, a theorist of freedom, considers that freedom is always realised in concreto instead of in abstracto, because choices are “my choices” instead of “choices” in general. In the philosopher’s opinion, we are condemned to be free, because the lack of choice is still a choice. Although an external constraint may exist, tipping the scales towards a certain choice, the latter is nevertheless free, as we can reject a certain option, even though we may suffer as a result of our choice. In Sartre’s opinion we are absolutely free and responsible for our options; furthermore, we are condemned to be free.

Simone de Beauvoir, another representative of contemporary existentialism, places the issue of freedom in relation with woman’s condition in society. Thus, when analysing the issue of sexual freedom, the French author points out gender differences in the perception of erotic pleasure, due to the responsibility of motherhood. Also, the issue of abortion, an expression of woman’s freedom of action in relation to her own body and of the freedom to determine her own life, involves on the one hand woman’s responsibility for the survival of the species and, at the same time, the limitation of the partner’s freedom of choosing between having or not having successors. A number of authors phrase the question thus: to what extent is freedom correlated to responsibility, and in the cases where this correlation imposes a value choice, which freedom and which responsibility has priority? In the following we shall explore the sense and the theoretical meanings of a form of transmodern social manifestation of individual freedom, autonomy, a central category of the discourse of applied ethics in life science and bioethics.

The construction of bioethics is viewed by Jennings as having a different trajectory in the academic space, as applied ethics, and in the medical space, as bioethics proper. The author presents two directions of understanding autonomy as positive, affirmative freedom, correlated with the individual’s right to manifest his/her own options and choices as a negative freedom, in correlation with moral duty, care, solidarity and mutual assistance. The focus of bioethics on the concept of autonomy and its understanding especially as a negative freedom is at the border between scientific, cultural and moral research, arriving to legitimise medical practices as a human experience that is meaningful and inherent to social routine. Medical technologies, present from the beginning to the end of man’s life, transform his body from a constant of human existence.
into a variable, modelled by one’s own actions and choices\textsuperscript{43}. Once the human genome has been decoded and the individual genetic profile has become known, each individual may be characterised through his/her genetic dispositions, each individual carries a risk to health (from heart disease risk to allergies, diabetes etc.) and each individual becomes a target for medical recommendations and warnings referring to his/her own lifestyle\textsuperscript{44}.

Negative freedom is understood as the absence of someone else’s control over one’s decisions, whereas positive freedom is viewed especially as self-control. For Berlin\textsuperscript{45} bioethics focuses chiefly on the individual’s positive freedom, expressed as self-determination and self-control, whereas autonomy understood as negative freedom concerns the absence of borders, of limitations that would reduce the others’ intrusion in the individual’s own life and decisions. Negative freedom\textsuperscript{46} consists in establishing a private zone of non-interference around each person, where he/she may exercise control over his/her own life in his/her own, personal manner. This is an extension of Mills’s vision from the area of political social thought to that of ethical reflections on freedom. The autonomous moral behaviour is equally interesting for decision-makers in the resource allocation policies in health, for the health insurance system, for companies – as far as employee and customer behaviour in matters of health is concerned. All this interest in regulating the behaviour of individuals may be a threat\textsuperscript{47} to the privacy and the autonomy of an increasing number of people, thus becoming a significant issue in bioethics research.

For instance, the topic of abortion brings into discussion the issue of women’s autonomy and control over their own bodies and over their own person during pregnancy. The debate for or against the freedom of abortion is centred on the ethical dilemma of choosing between a pregnant woman’s autonomy and right to self-determination on the one side and the rights of the unborn person (the foetus). Whereas Judith Jarvis Thomson\textsuperscript{48} suggests granting embryos the status of person and banning abortion in any circumstances with the exception of those that may endanger the woman’s life or health, Daniel Callahan\textsuperscript{49} supports the non-interference of law in the autonomy of individuals, namely of women. This controversy has generated the definition of autonomy as the absence of another person’s intervention in the decision-making process through which the individual is building his/her own freedom\textsuperscript{50}. The ethical debate continues in the area of reproductive autonomy and of using technology in solving the problem of infertility. Medically-assisted reproduction raises the issue of the autonomous control of one’s own gametes in the cases of donation, implant or cryopreservation. The discussion has revolved around restrictions imposed in the use of medically-assisted technology only for heterosexual couples that show a good state of health, morality and a potential for being good parents. The concerns raised by
the psychological, social and genetic effects of the child did not have enough weight when compared to the concept of a woman’s autonomy in choosing to become a mother51.

The current bioscientific technologies have already produced cloned animals, artificial chimeras and medication that can alter behaviour, mood and thought – all of them human conditions. These technologies have now the possibility to manipulate genes in order to create new and different species of humans. An unpredictable level of risk exists and there is no denying it that this risk could be terrible52. Susumu53 comments on Fukuyama’s suggestions concerning the need for a global regulation of scientific technologies. This regulation of technological developments should take into consideration not only rational arguments, but also religious beliefs and cultural models.

In genetic counselling, the concept of autonomy establishes the perspective of using nondirective counselling as a means for avoiding racism, discrimination and eugenics. Nondirective genetic counselling consists only in the clear, factual and easy to understand information of potential parents on therapeutic options, without discussing the reasonableness, prudence or ethical appropriateness of their option. Any other piece of information provided to the clients may be considered as having a coercive influence when provided by a person with professional authority. The definition of autonomy taken into consideration in this situation is “the exercise of individual and independent will of the person wishing to become a parent”.

It may appear that transferring the life creation power to technological development is actually working towards a glorification of the biblical idea of man’s existence according to God’s likeness and His image. Medically-assisted reproductive techniques are part of contemporary man’s demiurgic effort to apply technology to humanity itself, in the ultimate attempt at “controlling the origins of life”54. The ethical dilemmas generated by contemporary developments in medicine require a number of legal regulations that can be imposed through international conventions on patients’ rights, on research involving human subjects, re-definitions of the dignity of individuals and of the species. These areas have recently been reunited in an inter-disciplinary domain called biolaw55, which is developing in close relation with the development of medical practice and of bioethics.

The technologisation of motherhood on the one hand separates the parents’ biological roles from the social ones56, and on the other hand the role of genetic material provider from that of child-bearer in the case of women57. Whereas a number of authors discuss the impossibility of invoking the rights and interests of individuals in a state of non-existence (such as embryos, unfertilised eggs or sperm), others talk about the protection of the dignity of the human species58, which includes in the protection sphere human beings with a potential to be born59.
Treating human embryos and conception products obtained in vitro as so many collections of cells subject to property law is justified by the post-Kantian conception of the human person as a being that generates conscious and free acts. This vision is contested in bioethical and legal literature, starting from the argument of the presence of all the structures of the human body inside the fertilised egg in the shape of genetic information. In keeping with Vattimo’s ideas discussed above, according to which the culture of human rights and Western individualism have Christian roots, Susumo states that both attitudes, pro-choice and pro-life, share a common religious root, which the author identifies as value of life and sanctity of life. This idea has its origins in the Christian tradition, which says that man was created in God’s likeness and His image, and his soul is capable of attaining eternal life. The idea of the logocentric divinity has reached – via Enlightenment – the modern philosophy and ethics that define man through his intelligence and moral initiative, while considering entities without conscience and self-awareness as imperfect.

Another bioethical issue that deserved to be mentioned is that of cryopreservation of gametes and embryos and of posthumous fertilisation. Posthumous fertilisation is the situation in which one of the partners decides to carry out a fertilisation using reproductive material – in a state of cryopreservation – from a deceased spouse. This would contravene to the individuals’ right to autonomously decide on their reproductive activity, including after the demise of a spouse, as well as to the right to identity of the resulting child. In the British, French and American legal systems, the permission to carry out selective abortions in the cases where a major genetic defect is discovered in the foetus is accepted as correct. In these countries, the quasi-general acceptance of prenatal genetic testing and the mass application of genetic screening, as well as of selective abortion implicitly hides the reservations for the right of individuals with disabilities to be born and therefore to exist. A prohibitive attitude towards eugenics practices such as that generated by the Catholic reaction against abortion raises a number of problems in the area of the social costs of caring for people with disabilities.

Once the human genome has been decrypted, it has become possible to detect hereditarily-transmitted diseases and potential mutations. Eugenics with the purpose of improving the genetic potential of the species creates the risk of a new form of Nazi-type social inequality, favouring a superior race. The embryos created in vitro that would be implanted in the womb of the carrier mother may undergo an eugenic process based not solely on the medical criteria of avoiding disability risks, but also on criteria for the arbitrary selection of the unborn child’s features (eye colour, hair colour etc). The literature stresses that “there is a deviation from the natural evolution process”, jeopardizing the child’s identity construction. In its synodal documents, the Romanian Orthodox

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Church\textsuperscript{70}, categorically expresses its pro-life point of view, starting from the argument of the sanctity of life from the moment of conception.

Another sensitive subject in bioethics is cloning, be it therapeutic or reproductive\textsuperscript{71}. Reproductive cloning is viewed as endangering human dignity and even the dignity of the human species, which is jeopardised due to the cancellation of natural selection processes. Cloning as a form of asexual reproduction and of transmission of genetic information is as a rule forbidden by law\textsuperscript{72}. Between Christian and secular bioethics there are both metaphysical and epistemological differences. Whereas secular bioethics relies on an entirely scientific and rational discourse, Christianity-based bioethics allows irrational arguments, such as beliefs, mystical experiences and revealed texts\textsuperscript{73}.

The identity of the human being means however more than the mere genetic identity, being constructed in a complex process of socialisation that turns biologic potential into a reality with social meaning; therefore, the dream of re-creating Einstein, Charlemagne, or even Jesus Christ using cloning and genetic engineering is destined, in our opinion, to fail. On the other hand, we cannot ignore the fact that an individual born out of cloning may become virtuous due to the environment he/she developed in, despite the fact that the cloned person may have been a vicious one. Finally, we propose here a so far imaginary interrogation on the ethical and legal status of an entity obtained entirely by artificial means, using a technology that would reunite Craig’s research on the creation of artificial life, the research on cloning and that concerning the gestation of a human body. Would such an entity receive the status of “person”? And in doing so, would it have any rights?

If this is the case, many questions would have to be raised with regard to the definition of the human species. If this is not the case, then new forms of slavery might be invented. Ethical reflection and especially the evaluation of technologies\textsuperscript{74} in terms of ethics must answer unprecedented questions about the status of the human species and on the way we want to relate to the future generation. Lee Silver shocked America in 1997 with a book in which he foresaw that the world would soon be divided into two groups: “genetically-enhanced GenRich” and “unenhanced naturals\textsuperscript{75}. The former would be those that enjoy longevity, health and personal development as a result of body modifications using medical technology and bioscience\textsuperscript{76}. The development of medical technologies in this direction could become a new criterion for social hierarchies, giving birth to a privileged class. Susumu\textsuperscript{77} considers that research in the biosciences should focus on the concept of value of life partially derived from religious culture. In these circumstances, the additional issues to be discussed are the diversity of religious cultures and the diverse phenomenologies of the value of life.

As far as the use of embryos for research is concerned, the main Christian churches adamantly oppose it\textsuperscript{78}, based on the conviction that life
begins at the moment of fertilisation and the destruction of human embryos and foetuses is tantamount to murder. The root of this controversy may be identified in the social movements of the ‘70s on the topic of the Pro Choice Versus Pro Life conflict: the conflict between a woman’s right to have an abortion and the right of life of the conception product contains in it, implicitly, the conflicts of values concerning family life and society separating religious conservatives protecting the traditional family and the sanctity of life on the one side and reformists protecting women’s rights and the rights of minorities, much more permissive in terms of morals.

Although both religious and cultural personalities in various countries make possible a very diverse regulation of practices in the biomedical field, a number of challenges faced by the entire human society will have to be dealt with globally, through the consultation and agreement of the entire international community.

An existential analysis of ethical dilemmas concerning artificial life

From our point of view, we aim to point out the existential openings of artificial life. Accepting the definition of life as organic structures that exchange energy and substance with the environment and that multiply themselves may not be enough for the future discussions of bioethics applied to synthetic biology. The affirmation of man’s creative power should be doubled by an ethical and axiological reflexivity. The way in Genesis, at the moment of the original project, each creative stage was accompanied by an axiological moment in which “God saw that it was good”, the same way humanity’s great creative moments through which scientists such as Craig Venter reimplement the original project by carrying out the first artificial Genesis should be interspersed with reflective moments in which to question the way in which the meaning of the scientific fact is constructed and the manner in which this meaning will affect humanity’s existence.

Conclusions

The ethical implications of transmodernity stem from a number of new dimensions of the transmodern pragmatics discussed in this paper: globalism and the border-free society, the expansion of mediated communication and of the new communication technologies, the professionalisation and technologisation of communication, the deprivatization of private life and corporate social responsibility. Due to the fact that they use techniques for attitudinal and motivational behaviour modification, the ethical dimensions of modernity are connected precisely to this unifying trend specific to transmodernity as opposed to the atomising trend specific to postmodernity.
A first dimension of transmodern ethics would be the protection of human dignity. The legal principle of human dignity derives from the axiological conviction that human personality is paramount and that the connection between the individual and its right to dignity is unbreakable.

Dignity is therefore a positive attribute, which must be protected and affirmed. The affirmation of the human dignity of the individual on the one side and of the entire species on the other side represents a subtle transition from the specificity of individual rights in modernity and postmodernity to their universalisation in the phrase human dignity. In our vision, dignity, the protection of human dignity means much more than protecting individual rights, going from the passiveness of rights-that-have-to be defended to the active and affirmative protection of human dignity.

All the communication technologies developed in postmodernity have as their focus the positivity of human nature and assertiveness as methodological dimension. The social or personal change produced by these techniques can definitely be subordinated to the notion of assertiveness of the human condition. The focus on the positive – specific to this technology – requires a rejection of the ethics of interdiction and a re-positioning in an affirmative context based on a technique of intention. Naturally, in an affirmative ethics we cannot forego categorisation. The positive, the affirmative always required a complement. The negative, however, is no longer evil in itself, but instead an ethical alterity. Negative experiences are a challenge addressed to the affirmative, which expands at behavioural and attitudinal levels. The new communication technologies have redefined soteriology according to the dominant lay vision of society.

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